This paper proposes an analysis framework and model for estimating the impact of information security breach episodes. Previous methods either lack empirical grounding or are not sufficiently rigorous, general or flexible. There has also been no consistent model that serves theoretical and empirical research, and also professional practice. The proposed framework adopts an ex ante decision frame consistent with rational economic decision-making, and measures breach consequences via the anticipated costs of recovery and restoration by all affected stakeholders. The proposed branching activity model is an event tree whose structure and branching conditions can be estimated using probabilistic inference from evidence -'Indicators of Impact'. This approach can facilitate reliable model estimation when evidence is imperfect, incomplete, ambiguous, or contradictory. The proposed method should be especially useful for modeling consequences that extend beyond the breached organization, including cascading consequences in critical infrastructures.
Introduction
Every risk assessment method for information security includes some scale or measure to evaluate the negative consequences 1 of possible breach episodes. Most common are simple three-level If the impacts of breach episodes fit Gaussian distributions, then it would be progressively easier to estimate them with experience and information pooling, and the consequences of estimation errors would be moderate and manageable. However, information security breach impacts, especially in interdependent settings like critical infrastructures, appear to follow 'heavy tailed' distributions due to cascading consequences (Woolf et al. 2004 , Buldyrev et al. 2010 . Thus the likelihood of extreme impacts cannot be ignored as in the Gaussian case. Instead, the very existence of low probability/high severity loss scenarios often dominates risk management decisions.
Advancing research in this area is important to the scientific and policy communities involved in information security (National Science and Technology Council 2011). There is a significant gap in methods and frameworks between theoretical and empirical researchers, and also a gap between academic research and professional practice. For example, theoretical models of security investment (Gordon and Loeb 2002) and interdependent risk (Kunreuther and Heal 2003 , Heal and Kunreuther 2004 , Grossklags et al. 2008 , Böhme and Moore 2010 treat "loss" as a single real-valued parameter for each decision-maker. While such simplistic treatments are useful to make the analysis tractable, they essentially assume-away the most important aspect of the problem: how to estimate breach impact and likelihood in the first place. Furthermore, there is no empirical grounding for the assumption that decision-makers have well defined estimates of impact and likelihood. Quite the contrary. There is empirical evidence that decision-makers and stakeholders facing complex interdependent risk have poor estimates of risk (Barker and Haimes 2009 , Carreras et al. 2007 , Clement 1989 , Grebe 2013 , Guarro 1989 , Hansson 1999 , Kunreuther and Heal 2012 , Visschers et al. 2009 ).
In summary, without some reliable and robust breach impact estimation methods, quantified information security will continue to be a "weak hypothesis" (Verendel 2009 ).
Why Breach Impact Estimation is Hard
On the surface, it might appear that estimating the the impact of a breach episode is easya straight-forward accounting task where one waits until all the breach-related costs have been incurred and then calculates their sum using the affected firms' accounting records. A slightly more sophisticated version might be called the insurance claim method, where any party that Thomas et al.: How Bad Is It? -A Branching Activity Model Paper accepted by 12 th Workshop on the Economics of Information Security; version 2.0 3 has been harmed by a breach enumerates all their damages and losses using the equivalent of an insurance claim form and claim rules. However, these simple methods do not adequately address the complexities, uncertainties, and difficulties involved, as we now discuss.
• Disincentives to Disclose -There have been many studies (Bodeau 1992 , Cavusoglu et al. 2004 , Lambert 1993 , Rees 2009 , Sohail 2006 , Wang et al. 2008 showing that companies and individuals are reluctant to disclose information related to security breaches.
The reasons are many and they go beyond considerations of subjective utility or costs vs. benefits.
Yet it will not be possible to achieve collective security outcomes without disclosure and sharing other information regarding security (ENISA and RAND Europe 2010).
• Attribution of Consequences and Costs -Except for the smallest and simplest breach episodes, it can be hard to attribute costs to the breach. Many costs are indirect or bundled in overhead.
Furthermore, some important costs are not realized until long after the breach has been discovered.
• Intangibles -Even when costs can be properly attributed, there can be problems in valuation, especially for intangible assets like trade secrets or, more broadly, knowledge capital. So much of the value of intangibles depends on context and history that it is very hard to reliably estimate what value is lost when intangibles are impaired by a breach episode.
• Mis-estimation of Costs -A related problem is the tendency by some people to greatly overestimate or under-estimate costs associated with breach episodes. Sometimes this is due to mistakes in analysis or inadequate methods, but other times it is due to wishful thinking -enlarging or diminishing the cost of a breach furthers that person's or that organization's narrow self interest.
Some very large IT security companies are guilty of this practice (Thomas 2011c ).
• Incommensurate Consequences -Many times, the negative consequences on different stakeholders cannot be easily measured using a single scale of cost or impact. For example, consumers might experience a violation of privacy or betrayal of trust, while a corporation might experience material losses in terms of lost customers. In the same setting, government agencies might be contending with civil unrest or social upheaval as a result of the breach episode.
• Uncertainty, Absence of Information, and Ignorance -Loss in value of IT assets or intellectual property can be very difficult to estimate because much of the information is missing or inaccessible, lost in history, not known within sufficient bounds of confidence, or there might be severe 'unknown-unknowns' that are outside the mental frames of the analysts (Hansson 1999 , Acquisti and Grossklags 2005 , Barker and Haimes 2009 , Hassel et al. 2009 , van Asselt and Rotmans 2002 .
• Ambiguity -Similarly, much of the information about the breached firm before, during, and after the breach episode can be ambiguous (Hansson 1999, Acquisti and Grossklags 2005) . For example, imagine a corporation that sells off a business unit that was breached severely, but does
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• Near-misses, 'Technical Debt' and Other Counterfactuals -There needs to be some way to account for breach impacts that haven't yet happened, but might. These are called 'counterfactuals'
and they play a very important role in rational decision-making under uncertainty, especially in strategic settings. A classic example of this are are near-miss events (Clement 1989 , Muermann and Oktem 2002 , Phimister et al. 2003 , Thomas 2009a , Vanderschaaf 1992 , Wright and van der Schaaf 2004 , which except for some small twist of fate could have turned into a major loss episode. It is vital that people and organizations recognize and learn from near-miss events. Another example is captured in the phrase 'technical debt' (Brown et al. 2010 , Guo et al. 2011 , Klinger et al. 2011 , which refers to short cuts and other expedient actions taken by IT system designers prior to a release. These may not 'cost' them anything in the very short-run, but sooner or later the 'debt' must be paid off eventually, either through patching or through the cost of security breaches.
• Plural Interests and Decision Frames -Any attempt to estimate breach impact will have to contend with the many different interests, values, and decision frames of stakeholders (Hassel et al. 2009 , Visschers et al. 2009 ). Some will emphasize fairness, others will emphasize responsibility, while others will emphasize rational cost-benefit thinking. This can also take the form of differing attitudes toward risk and ambiguity. These can be strongly shaped and constructed through social perceptions and interactions.
• Bias -Finally, many people and sources of information will have biases that color their estimates of loss or harm (Acquisti and Grossklags 2004) , or beliefs about the root causes and people to hold responsible. It is often very hard to present 'ground truth' in a way that will mitigate bias.
Related Work
Gordon and Loeb (2002) present an equilibrium economic model for optimal investment in information security; essentially aiming to optimize the expected costs due to losses, balanced by the costs associated with security investments. However, their model does not include any process for estimating losses or how to relate loss levels, or probability of loss to security investments. Bodin et al. (2005) applied the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) to address investment decisions with limited/fixed budgets and how to make the case for budget increases. They build an ordinal scorecard system using a three-part taxonomy for security harm: "confidentiality", "integrity", and "availability". Beyond this they do not attempt to estimate breach impact. Wong (2008) , in a working paper, proposed a fixed formula for calculating cost of a breach by enumerating various cost categories. His aim is practical, but this approach does not adequately address the difficulties described in the previous section. Thomas (2011a) presented criticisms of their approach and methods.
Several researchers have attempted to go around the difficulties mentioned in Section 1.1, above, by studying the stock market reaction to news of the breach episode. This research approach rests on a semi-strong version of the Efficient Market Hypothesis, which asserts that new public information is immediately incorporated into share prices in proper proportion to its effect on the market value of the company. Campbell et al. (2003) studied the economic effect of information security breaches on stock prices. Overall, they find a weak relationship between breaches and decline in stock prices. However, there is a very significant relationship between decline in stock price and breaches involving unauthorized access to confidential data. More broadly, impact of breaches are sensitive to context. Garg et al. (2003) also studied stock market reactions to various information security events, with mixed and somewhat confusing results. Cavusoglu et al. (2004) found significant changes in stock market value in the two days following public disclosure of the breach. Specifically, they found that breach cost was higher for Internet-only firms and that breaches are costlier for smaller firms than larger firms.
Society of Actuaries (2010) provides a tutorial introduction to the financial pricing of operational risk, which is a super-set of information security risk. Thomas (2009b) builds on this to propose a method for pricing risk to facilitate enterprise-level risk management and risk pooling. Estimation of impact losses is a key element of their proposed methods. Anderson et al. (2012) and Hyman (2013) study the cost of cybercrime at a national and international level. They detail many of the measurement and estimation problems described above.
They use estimation methods that use available information while avoiding gross mis-estimation.
However, their studies do not attempt to estimate the impact of individual breach episodes.
There is a large literature on the role of near-miss and precursor events in disaster management, e.g. Alamgir et al. (2009), Muermann and Oktem (2002) , Phimister et al. (2003 ), Vanderschaaf (1992 , Wright and van der Schaaf (2004) . In the context of risk management for information security, Thomas (2009a) presents an analysis of the cost of a near-miss breach event and makes the case that it should not be cost-free. Likewise, many authors have explored the challenges of uncertainty and ambiguity in risk management, e.g. Acquisti and Grossklags (2005) , Barker and Haimes (2009), Hansson (1999) , Johnson et al. (2010) , Masys (2012) , Grossklags et al. (2010), van Asselt and Rotmans (2002) .
The annual Verizon Data Breach Investigation Report (DBIR) (Baker et al. 2012 ) is an example of statistical analysis of a large sample set of breach incidents. However, the scope of the DBIR has been limited to technical aspects of breaches and not on business response or business impact. At a policy level, there is widespread consensus that measuring breach impact and, more generally, measuring information security and risk is a very high priority for research, and also that our current state of knowledge and practice are woefully inadequate (Cashell et al. 2004 Finally, several authors have published ideas that are similar to those presented in this paper. Borg (2005) presented a qualitative analysis of economically complex attacks and breach episodes, and discussed branching processes for consequences among others. Thomas (2009b) presented a framework for pricing risk associated with information security, and it included suggestions regarding methods to estimate frequency and severity of major breach episodes.
Overview of the Paper
An analysis framework is proposed in Section 2. The aim of this framework is to encompass a broad range of breach episodes and applications. In Section 3 a branching process model is proposed to estimate the consequences and impact of breach episodes. Section 4 describes Indicators of Impact, including a discussion of information sources. The paper concludes with discussion of the results in Section 5, including limitations, generalizations, use cases, and directions for future research.
Analysis Framework
The goal of this analysis framework is to address the difficulties raised in Section 1.1, above, and to apply broadly to both academic research and professional practice. The following is a description of each element in the analysis framework along with brief justifications where necessary. We choose to focus on negative consequences that cause harm by degrading a person's or organization's ability to function as a holistic system. This is in contrast to other approaches that take a more atomic approach and focus on harm to specific assets, especially IT assets. We believe that analyzing harm to functions or capabilities at a system level is more general and is less sensitive to the details of organization or information structures. By analogy, this method is like estimating severity of an infectious disease, which is assessed in a holistic way considering the whole person, as distinct from a survey of specific organs or tissue that may be infected. The holistic assessment gives a better estimate of severity of the infection, better guidance for modes of treatment, and better estimate of likelihood of recovery.
Scope: Breach Episodes
Our scope of analysis is a breach episode, which consists of a complete campaign by a defined set of threat actors, from first contact to final resolution. This scope is broader than other methods whose unit of analysis is a breach event for a specific IT asset (e.g. the compromise of a specific web server).
We have chosen this more inclusive scope for several reasons. First, it more realistically includes the full consequences and the response/recovery activities of affected people or organizations. Second, this broad scope encompasses all of the cascading consequences that are directly attributable to the harm caused by threat actors, including consequences outside of the breached organization(s).
Finally, this scope offers the possibility of consistency when building a database of information about breach episodes of widely differing sizes and types.
Ex Ante Decision Frame
We choose to estimate breach impact in the context of a forward-looking (ex ante) decision frame.
In other words, all breach impacts will be estimated as though a person or organization were making value-based decisions before the breach episode occurred. Effectively, this values the breach impact according to the a probabilistic estimate of the ensemble of outcomes that would include one factual realization (i.e. what actually happens in a given breach episode) and also near-by counterfactual realizations (i.e. all the outcomes that almost happened in a given breach episode, including near-misses, lucky or unlucky breaks, excellent or sloppy execution, and so on). This decision frame choice may be controversial and thus we provide five justifications, as follows.
First, it puts the costs of a breach on an equal footing with the investments a person or firm might make to avoid or mitigate the breach. Another way of saying this is that it is consistent with the 'principle of marginal utility' -a core normative principle for rational economic decisionmaking 3 since the Marginal Revolution of the 1890s (Marshall 1898 , Stigler 1950a Paper accepted by 12 th Workshop on the Economics of Information Security; version 2.0
and Nordhaus 2009). According to the principle of marginal utility, all economic decisions should be made according to the incremental costs and benefits (looking forward), with no regard for costs that have already been incurred ('sunk costs').
Second, it allows for consistent cost estimation across long time periods, incorporating both the time value of money and financial risk preferences of decision-makers. In contrast, blending historical costs with projected costs is fraught with difficulties and is often not possible to do without inconsistency or logical error.
Third, it admits a consistent method for estimating hard-to-measure scenarios using 'Willingness
To Pay' and 'Willingness To Accept' (Gafni 1991) . A prime example of this is reputation damage.
It may be hard for decision-maker to place a value on all the forms of reputation damage they might experience, but such valuation is made somewhat easier and more consistent if it is framed as "What are you willing to pay ex ante to recover from this reputation damage, assuming that it will occur?" These values can be estimated prospectively, by experiments, or retrospectively by observing what people and companies actually spend to restore their reputation in various settings.
Fourth, an ex ante decision frame is consistent with several proposed mechanisms to mitigate moral hazard associated with principal-agent relationships in financial industry risk management.
Examples of these mechanisms include the 'pre-commitment approach' O'Brien 1995, 1997) , burden sharing (Goodhart and Schoenmaker 2006) , and risk pooling (Zhao et al. 2009 ). We believe this is an important avenue of innovation regarding incentive instruments and institutions for information security.
Finally, an ex ante decision frame embraces near-miss events as having a non-zero cost (Thomas 2009a ). This is a very important feature for incentive mechanisms aimed at promoting prudence and organization learning (Mahajan 2010 , Alamgir et al. 2009 , Borg 2005 , Clement 1989 , Muermann and Oktem 2002 , Phimister et al. 2003 , Vanderschaaf 1992 , Wright and van der Schaaf 2004 ).
Measure of Impact: Recovery and Restoration Efforts
We propose that the best measure of breach impact is the combined efforts that affected stakeholders would be willing to spend to recover from the breach in all aspects. 'Effort' here means commitment of valuable resources, time, attention, etc. in some organized process, routine, or of questionable cause and related logical fallacies. "Post hoc ergo propter hoc" is Latin for "after this, therefore because of this". The fallacy can be expressed in logical propositions: 1) A occurred, then (undesirable) B occurred. 2) Therefore, avoiding A will prevent B. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post_hoc_ergo_propter_hoc. More simply, we can never follow the last sentence in this witty advice: "Don't gamble; take all your savings and buy some good stock and hold it till it goes up, then sell it. If it don't go up, don't buy it." [attributed to Will Rogers] and corporate transactions and it also has been used in previous research on information security breach impact estimation (e.g. Guarro (1989) , Rainer Jr et al. (1991) ). This method has merits, especially when the primary issue is legal liability or responsibility, or political blame. However, it has significant shortcomings compared to the proposed method of recovery and restoration effort.
First, loss-in-value, especially non-monetary losses, often have no observable indicators or symptoms. This makes loss estimation very expensive and information intensive. In contrast, recovery and restoration efforts almost always have observable indicators since they require spending time, energy, resources, or attention that otherwise wouldn't be spent. Very often there are identifiable processes, projects, meetings, or communications associated with them.
Second, loss in value is very hard to apply to non-commercial organizations. In contrast, recovery and restoration efforts apply to any purposeful entity or organization, including individual people, families, community groups, non-profits, government agencies, military organizations, or any combination.
Third, loss in value does not incorporate the stakeholder's trade-off preferences in the context of breach recovery, whereas the recovery and restoration approach does. For example, consider a regional government agency that might value their emergency communication center at $1 million and their fleet of trucks at $500,000. Consider a cyber-physical emergency scenario where they lose both capabilities. They might be willing to spend more to restore and recover their truck fleet over the communication center in order to provide for citizen evacuation, transporting relief supplies, etc. The emergency communication center might be lower priority because they have a fall-back communication capability at the state level.
Finally, focusing on recovery and restoration efforts promotes resilience planning. In contrast, loss in value is less useful in resilience planning and tends to put the focus on prevention and avoidance. The example in the previous paragraph points to a very important principle of systemic resilience -the ability to restore operations to some minimal level quickly, even though it might be far below the normal level. Furthermore, most organizations and many families have previous experience in recovery and restoration from shocks or emergencies in other settings -e.g. adverse
Paper accepted by 12 th Workshop on the Economics of Information Security; version 2.0 weather, power blackouts, civil unrest, economic crisis, etc. All of these can be used to estimate recovery and restoration in the case of information security breaches. Thus, estimating recovery and restoration efforts is very compatible with resilience planning in many different scenarios.
A critic might argue that measuring impact through recovery and restoration efforts has flaws, too. The following paragraphs list possible flaws with the proposed approach, along with our rejoinders.
There might be an endowment effect where stakeholders who have limited or no resources to invest in recovery and restoration might undervalue their losses. One a way to mitigate any undervaluing is to include recovery and restoration efforts that might be funded by identified sources other than the affected stakeholder. This has empirical grounding in studies of disaster response, refugee relief, and similar settings.
The recovery and restoration approach might be too strict and leave out some material consequences or losses. While this may be significant in ex post settings, we believe that it is useful to have conservative estimates of impact for ex ante planning, investment, and incentive purposes.
If nothing else, conservative estimates are more easily validated, are more repeatable when examined by independent analysts, will be more credible to decision-makers, and are less likely to be disputed.
Another possible flaw is that stakeholders might be biased or or be unable to estimate recovery/restoration efforts ex ante, and thereby undervaluing them. While it is true that several forms bias, such as optimistic overconfidence, blame shifting, or disaster myopia, might distort ex ante valuation and estimation, we believe that the best remedy for bias is to focus stakeholder attention on the practical tasks of recovery and restoration in given scenarios.
Finally, there might be some impact scenarios that are considered unrecoverable, such as firm bankruptcy, irreparable damage to a person's reputation, or, on large scale, permanent harm to national security. These are addressed in the next item.
It should be noted that the two methods -loss in value and recovery and restoration effortwould have identical or very close valuation of direct monetary losses due to theft, embezzlement, fraud, or extortion. If $100,000 is stolen from a company's bank account due to ACH fraud, both the loss in value method and the recovery and restoration effort method would value the impact as $100,000 plus the cost of investigation and prosecution.
Impact of Non-recoverable Consequences as the Limit of Recoverable Scenarios
We propose that the impact of non-recoverable consequences can be estimated by constructing a sequence of scenarios, each progressively more severe but recoverable, leading to the non-recoverable scenario. Consider firm bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is not an isolated phenomenon but instead is part Thomas et 
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of a progression of events related to declining credit quality, declining liquidity, declining financing capability, and generalized financial stress. Each stage in the progression might be associated with a credit downgrade by a rating agency or credit bureau. But a credit downgrade short of bankruptcy is recoverable through financial or operational actions, or both -e.g. sale of assets, reduction in cost structure, raising prices, terminating unprofitable product lines, etc. Even a bankruptcy itself is recoverable in some cases through reorganization and recapitalization. There is a wealth of research on the cost of declining credit quality and bankruptcy, and we suggest that this could provide sufficient foundation to estimate the cost of non-recoverable bankruptcy as a limit.
This concludes our presentation of the proposed analysis framework.
Branching Activity Models
This section describes branching activity models for response and recovery efforts associated with breach episodes as a method to estimate . A branching activity model is a tree or graph (Bolton and Davies 2000) where nodes are activities (also known as routines, business processes, or projects) and the edges represent an existential causal relationship between activities: e.g. A 2 is initiated-by
Thus, every activity is initiated by some other activity, and each activity executes until it reaches some stopping condition. The structure of the branching activity model is generally not fixed or perfectly predictable ex ante. Instead, the structure is dynamic and depends on the emerging context and endogenous discoveries.
Branching activity models of recovery and restoration efforts have some similarities to attack graphs (Wang et al. 2007 ) which have been used in information security research for some time, but they are very different. Attack graphs show the sequence of breaches or penetrations necessary for the attacker to achieve some goal. However, attack graphs do not reveal any information regarding the negative consequences or impact of successful attacks. In contrast, the branching activity models of recovery and restoration do not include the attack or breach process, nor the 'damage' or harm at the IT asset level that resulted from the attack(s). Therefore, they are complementary to each other for most purposes, including probabilistic risk assessment.
An Illustrative Example
Consider a fictional breach episode at a manufacturer of control systems, where attackers apparently stole confidential information related to the supply chain, perhaps with a goal of under-bidding on major international contracts. A simplified branching activity model for response and recovery is shown in Figure 1 . The response and recovery activities involved both the breached firm and their major supply chain partners. Assume that activities A, B, and C are 'Standard Operating Procedure' for incident response for this firm and thus are quite predictable in their duration and costs. The other activities -D, E, and F -are less routine and are defined according to the context.
The activities were initiated as follows: A. Technical Response -the IT and Security teams investigate the breach, identify affected IT assets, and implement immediate mitigations. Along the way, they discover evidence of custom malware and patterns of compromise that point to supply chain information as the goal of the attack. The cost of this activity is proportional to the number of IT assets compromised and the complexity of mitigations required.
B. Legal Response -the Legal team initially advices executives regarding governing laws
and regulations, contacts law enforcement, and informs the rest of the response teams regarding governing laws and regulations. Along the way, they discover evidence related to the breach that leads them to start a forensic investigation, due to regulations governing supply chain security. The cost of this activity is relatively fixed for any breach above a threshold of criticality.
C. Business Response -the Business team investigates the business consequences, including contracts, product quality, and customer relations. Along the way, they discover that the breach could affect on-going contract negotiations with major critical infrastructure customers in the US and internationally. However, their investigation concluded that the are explored and implemented. The cost of this activity is proportional to the number of supply chain partners and their relative maturity regarding information security, and also their previous experience in collaboration on information security.
E. Forensic Investigation -an outside consulting firm is engaged to gather as much evidence as possible about the attack methods, procedures, and characteristics, with a goal of attributing the attack, supporting law enforcement, and fulfilling regulatory requirements.
The cost of this activity is proportional to the amount of digital evidence available and the difficulty of recovering it for investigation purposes.
F. Public Relations -a focused PR campaign was launched, including as team members staff from each major supply chain partner. The PR campaign was aimed at major customers, regulators, shareholders, and employees across the supply chain. The cost of this activity is proportional to the number of campaign elements and the overall duration.
X. Crisis Response -This is 'counterfactual' because it was not realized in this fictional breach episode. No crisis materialized. Even so, there is a non-zero probability that the negative consequences could cascade into a full-blown crisis, leading to loss of major contracts, law suits, and other very large costs. In this fictional case, nearly all the worst-case scenarios incur the largest proportion of costs from Crisis Response activities (see Figure 2b ).
The total impact of this breach measured as total costs, I, would be calculated as the sum of the costs of individual activities, C i , i ∈ (A . . . F ), plus the additional Crisis Response activities that must be accounted for in the ex ante decision frame, C X . Each is multiplied by ξ i which is its ex ante probability of being realized in the branching process:
Notice that this is not a sum of scalar numbers, but instead a sum of random variables, each with a distribution of costs associated with it and also a probability of being realized. With heterogeneous branching processes and cost distributions, it is necessary to use Monte Carlo simulation 5 to estimate the aggregate distribution I and the contingency probability ξ. Because of the simplicity of the illustrative example, the following values for ξ were calculated analytically: 
Paper accepted by 12 th Workshop on the Economics of Information Security; version 2.0 3.1.1. Discussion. Figure 2 shows results of Monte Carlo simulations for two treatments for the activity tree. Figure 2a treats the activity network as fixed, meaning that the only source of variation is the distribution of costs for each activity. It is not surprising to see a distribution that is somewhat similar to lognormal because the cost distributions are either Normal, lognormal, or mixtures of the two. Most important, the distribution has a single mode and moderately wide variance. Thus, the mean is a good statistic for the central tendency for this distribution. If this were the only analysis that we saw, we might conclude that these activities have a single combined effect in terms of cost (our measure of aggregate impact in this example). Figure 2b treats the activity network as a branching activity model as prescribed by this paper.
Two hundred branching trees were realized using random draws given the branching probabilities, and then 500 iterations of Monte Carlo simulations for each realization were performed. It is interesting to see that the mean in this treatment is very close to the mean in Figure 2a . But the similarities stop there. First, it is very apparent that this distribution has two very distinct modes, and can even be seen as a simple mixture of two distributions, even though we know that seven activities contribute their distributions to the final mixture. Second, the variance is much wider than in the first treatment, not only on the upper tail due to the inclusion of the 'X. Crisis
Response' activity but also on the lower tail, meaning that there is considerable probability mass below the mean. In fact, we can safely say that the mean is not a good measure of central tendency in this distribution, as it will be frequently either too high or too low for individual realizations. Based on this data and analysis, what can we say about the aggregate impact of this breach episode? One interpretation is to view this breach episode as a near-miss for a much more severe episode that would at least double the costs and involve serious crisis management. Indeed, the simplest interpretation of Figure 2b is that there are two categories of breach episodes: 1) breach episodes that are contained in the initial response; and 2) breach episodes that can require response and recovery via secondary response, which is often lengthy and expensive.
Since this is a hand-crafted and fabricated example, we should not try to draw any general conclusions. This example does show the potential for the proposed branching activity model method to make good use of available evidence to derive estimates of breach episode impact.
In particular, it is very clear in this example how the branching activity model reveals more information about the causal structure that underlies breach response and recovery. We believe that the results will be even more revealing in settings that are more complex -i.e. cascading consequences or severe uncertainties.
Method for Empirical Analysis
The following are the steps that an analyst would take to analyze particular breach episodes using the branching activity model and Indicators of Impact (c.f. Section 4).
Step 1. Define the scope of the breach episode in terms of affected people and organizations, and also in time.
Step 2. Identify and list the primary sources of evidence .
Step 3. Construct a timeline, both for historical events and possible future events.
Step 4. List Indicators of Impact using primary sources from Step 2.
Step 5. Identify uncertainties, missing information, ambiguity, etc.
Step 6. Draw a branching activity model, similar to Figure 1 .
Step 7. Estimate parameters for the cost function for each activity (e.g. time, resources, $).
Step 8. Estimate aggregate impact statistics using Monte Carlo simulation.
This list of steps applies to the analysis of a single breach episode. The next section will discuss additional analysis methods that can be applied to a mass of evidence regarding a collection of breach episodes.
Model Selection and Estimation Methods
Model selection is an inference process where alternative mathematical or statistical model structures are evaluated against some criteria of fitness, correctness, or parsimony (Burnham and Anderson 2002) . In our setting, we face a challenge of choosing from alternative tree or graph structures for a branching activity model. Likewise, estimating the branching probabilities is a critical step in the method, and thus would benefit from the combined application of complementary estimation methods. The following is a list of possible methods and their application to this setting. Clearly, this is fertile ground for future research. (Baker et al. 2012 , Widup 2011 ).
• Probabilistic reasoning using Indicators of Impact and other evidence -This can include pattern recognition, classification, inductive reasoning from evidence, and reasoning about uncertainty (Schum 2001 , Barker and Haimes 2009 , Loch et al. 2008 , Masys 2012 , Sniedovich 2007 , van Asselt and Rotmans 2002 , Ferrin et al. 2009 ). These insights and inferences should be very informative for Steps 5, 6, and 7, above.
• Opinions of subject matter experts -Calibrated estimates of probability can be reliably elicited from subject matter experts (Hubbard 2010) . But rather than having the experts try to estimate aggregate impact or costs, it might be much more fruitful to elicit estimates of branching probabilities and other conditional probabilities.
• Simulations -Building simulations of breach response and recovery as a socio-technical system could be very useful in estimating branching probabilities and other parameters of a branching activity model. Candidate methods include stochastic process models and Agent-based Modeling (ABM).
• Experiments -Human subject experiments could be a valuable source of data and insights, especially regarding ex ante valuation of alternative breach response and recovery models. These experiments could be included as part of scenario analysis exercises, Red Team vs. Blue Team exercises, and crisis walkthrough exercises.
• Case studies -In-depth analysis of specific cases can yield many valuable insights regarding the qualitative and quantitative aspects of breach response and recovery activities and decision processes.
• Theoretical models -In addition to these empirical methods, theoretical models of breach response and recovery could be very helpful (e.g. Gordon et al. (2003) ), either to establish Bayesian priors for key parameters or to explore a full range of possible outcomes for a given setting.
Computer Simulation
We are in the early stages of computer implementation and simulation 6 of branching activity models, and so our discussion here is preliminary. The following is a few remarks on alternatives and promising approaches. 6 The computer code for used in the illustrative example in Section 3.1 can be found at [URL] There is a rich literature on deterministic, stochastic, and decision-theoretic branching systems.
Examples of deterministic systems include rewrite systems (Prusinkiewicz et al. 2003) , fractals, and cellular automata (Wolfram 2002) . Examples of stochastic branching processes include GaltonWatson process and variants (Orenshtein 2011) . Other examples include Stochastic Petri Networks (Chen et al. 2011) and Stochastic Activity Networks (Sanders and Meyer 2001, Vakili et al. 2011 ).
Most of these stochastic systems can be converted into equivalent Markov Chains, either Discrete Time or Continuous Time, and this provides a very general computational method -Markov Chain
Monte Carlo (MCMC) and modern improvements. Indeed, there are representation methods that have promise for our purposes, such as Semi-Markov Processes, Markov Decision Processes, and
Hidden Markov Models.
However, one general short-coming of these methods is that they assume a static causal structures. As described in previous sections, this setting calls for a method that can encompass dynamic causal structures. There are some very interesting methods being developed in the field of Computational Biology to model morphogenesis. These are include context-sensitive, non-deterministic rewrite systems such as P1L-System and Dynamical System with a Dynamical Structure (DS) 2 in the MGS system (Giavitto and Michel 2005 , Giavitto et al. 2011 , Michel 2007 ).
An area for future investigation is to add decision-theoretic and game-theoretic branching mechanisms to the deterministic and stochastic mechanisms just discussed.
Finally, there are interesting developments in the field of Cognitive Science related to probabilistic programming using language systems such as CHURCH (Goodman et al. 2008 ). Probabilistic programming is an extension and generalization of Bayesian belief networks and is well suited to formal representation of causal reasoning and induction of theory Tenenbaum 2007, 2009 ). This capability could augment the stochastic simulation by supporting probabilistic inference from evidence regarding branching activity models.
This concludes the presentation on the branching activity model. The following two sections describe how branching activity models can be estimated from evidence and other means.
Assumptions and Limitations
While we aim to make the branching activity model as general as possible, it is based on several important assumptions regarding the nature of breach response and recovery and on the application of the model in practice. Many of these assumptions need testing or validation:
1. Impact is more meaningful on the holistic level than it is on the asset level.
2. Estimating the recovery/response activities will be easier than enumerating vulnerabilities and exploits of IT assets, and then estimating resulting loss of value.
3. The existential causal structure between activities is essentially a tree.
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5. Impacts that cannot be translated to recovery or restoration activities are not significant or relevant.
6. With enough preparation and recovery/restoration activities, breached organizations can discover what they need to know about the breach and its negative consequences.
7. We can safely abstract away from the detailed discovery and decision processes with each activity.
8. Organizations and institutions will be more willing to share information in the form of Indicators of Impact and breach activity models than they currently do regarding details of specific breach episodes.
The proposed methods has limitations. Perhaps the most significant limitation is that it not especially well suited to one-off analysis of a single breach episode. While the example above in Section 3.1 shows this is possible, the analyst may find it laborious and perhaps no more enlightening than a formula-based method. In contrast, the primary benefits of the proposed method will
shine when large amounts of data are collected and statistical inference methods are applied to identify regularities and common patterns.
Another important limitation is that the proposed method is not well suited to ex post estimation of damage, harm, or liability for legal or regulatory purposes, or to assign blame for political purposes. There are many requirements for ex post estimation that are not included and are not compatible with our proposal.
Indicators of Impact
An 'Indicator of Impact' is an observable event, behavior, action, state change, or communication that signifies that the breached or affected organizations are attempting to respond, recover, restore, rebuild, or reposition because they believe they have been harmed. For our purposes, Indicators of Impact are evidence that can be used to estimate branching activity models of breach impact, either the structure of the model or key parameters associated with specific activity types. In principle, every Indicator of Impact is observable by someone, though maybe not outside the breached organization.
It is also useful to define them by what they are not. The following are not Indicators of Impact:
• Opinions, beliefs, fears, or concerns
• Unsubstantiated claims, guesses, or imagined possibilities
• Quantitative estimates of aggregate impact in terms of cost, losses, damages, etc.
• Ordinal estimates of aggregate impact in terms of harm, severity, etc. and attribution of a breach to particular threat agents.
Sources
One very important characteristic of Indicators of Impact is that information about them can come from a wide variety of sources. This stands in sharp contrast to sources of information regarding possible loss in value where there are very few reliable sources, as discussed in Section 2.4. The following is a list of sources we have been drawing on in case studies.
• News Reports and Official Statements
• Legal and Regulatory Filings, including SEC filings and correspondence.
• Social Media
• Financial and Industry Analyst Reports
• Security Industry White Papers, Blogs, and Technical Reports
• Leaked Documents
• Posted Procedures and Standards
• Public Communication Activities
• Executive Activities, Movements, and Communications
• Corporate Transactions
• Trade Press
• News Releases by Professional Service Firms (e.g. PR Agencies)
• Conference Presentations
• Requests for Proposals, Requests for Information, etc.
• Staffing Changes
In summary, collecting information about Indicators of Impact is very similar to Open Source
Intelligence that is practiced by National and Homeland Security professionals, and also industrial analysts who follow their competitors.
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Discussion
This closing section will address three broad questions: 1) Does the proposed method get to 'ground truth' regarding impact of historical breaches?; 2) Can breach impact estimates be generalized and mapped to a "severity index" to support risk communication and public awareness?; and 3) What are the use cases for the proposed method, and how will it make a difference? The section will conclude with a short discussion of opportunities for future research.
The 'Ground Truth' of Breach Impact is Ex Ante Valuation
History is overrated, at least regarding breach impact. What matters most is what might happen in the future if a given breach episode were to occur again. One way to demonstrate the validity of this assertion through a simple example of betting on coin tosses. Imagine that you receive a payment of $100 for each toss of 'heads' and nothing for 'tails'. Consider two realizations of ten tosses each. Imagine that in the first realization the coin tosses are all 'heads', and in the second realization the coin tosses are all 'tails'. What is the 'ground truth' of the coin tossing process?
We assert that the most important 'ground truth' is the fairness of the coin tossing process, or, more generally, the relative probability of 'heads' vs 'tails'. While the historical payoff from the two realizations ($1,000 and $0) certainly affects your bank balance, what matters most for future betting is the expected future payoff of coin tossing. Our estimate of expected future payoffs would certainly be informed by the historical payoffs and other relevant evidence, but is not simply a record of history. In other words, we would not expect that future realizations would be either all 'heads' or all 'tails' unless there was some really strong evidence to back up that unlikely inference.
The real 'truth' about our history in this case is that you were really lucky in the first realization and were really unlucky in the second. History matters but only as a source of evidence to use for understanding the future.
Likewise, in any given breach episode, there will be chance factors that might cause the actors to be lucky or unlucky. Some actors could also make strategic decisions to minimize or exaggerate the costs through less-than-prudent decisions, e.g. to forego forensic investigation or to avoid notifying legal authorities. Both chance and strategic behavior could cause the historical realization of breach impact to be much higher or much lower than would be expected ex ante. Thus, the 'ground truth' of any given breach episode is the expected value of impact, using both history and other evidence in our estimation procedure.
Perhaps the best way to view our approach is to say we are applying a valuation procedure for breach impact for a given breach process, and that this breach process has been realized in a particular case if the breach has already occurred, or might be realized in particular scenarios if such a breach has not yet occurred. branching activity models to some more general ordinal categories of severity.
We believe that this might be possible, but it critically depends on how we define the criteria for the ordinal categories. One approach is to use first-order stochastic dominance (Blavatskyy 2011), where breaches in higher categories would be first-order stochastically dominant over breaches in lower categories. Another approach would be to use methods of statistical physics to characterize the structure of the dynamics in state space to categorize different breach episode types. Further research is needed to see if either of these methods are viable, robust, and sufficient. If they are, then the resulting severity index would be much more sound than existing proposals such as Stiennon (2013) .
Use Cases
• Enterprise Risk Management -The proposed method would be very valuable in probabilistic risk assessment, including financial measures of risk at the level of business units or the enterprise as a whole. (Thomas 2009b , Society of Actuaries 2010)
• Near-miss and Precursor Identification -The branching activity model is well-suited to assist in identifying near-miss events and precursors because it includes counterfactual activities and estimates of branching probabilities for those activities. In contrast, formula-based methods for breach impact estimation exclude or under-value near miss events.
• Real-time Situation Awareness and Crisis Management -In the context of an unfolding breach episode, perhaps in a crisis situation, it is often vital for decision-makers to have accurate and up-to-date assessments of the negative consequences and severity of damages, and also some way of estimating the effectiveness of alternative response activities. Branching activity models could be very useful in this application. It could aid both central crisis management teams and decentralized action teams to quickly assess the likely impact, given the evidence, and the possible mitigating actions that are available. There is also a natural connection to preparation exercises, where the branching activity models could be both utilized and also tuned based on the outcomes of exercises.
• Resilience Planning -In resilience planning for information security, we assume that a given breach episode has already happened, and the planner's goal is to minimize the impact and to recover to a workable state as soon as possible (Dondossola et al. 2011 , Rose 2004a , Vugrin et al. 2011 . Because the proposed branching activity model is focused on response and recovery activities, it is ideally suited to support resilience planning.
• Public Disclosure and Risk Communication -The branching activity model and impact estimates derived from it should provide a viable method for public disclosure of breach episodes in a way that is more meaningful to stakeholders than current disclosure methods. Furthermore, if the disclosure is in the form of a parameterized branching activity model, then the disclosing firm will not be revealing any information to attackers that might aid them in future attacks. Also such a disclosure will not expose the firm to greater risk of legal or regulatory liability, since the branching activity model does not include information relevant to those purposes. Finally, as discussed in Section 5.2, categorizing breach episode types according to general ordinal categories of severity could improve risk communication.
• Critical Infrastructure Information Sharing -In critical infrastructure sectors, the value and importance of sharing information regarding information security is heightened by the interdependent nature of risk, by the severity of worst-case breach episodes, and the broad social consequences (ENISA and RAND Europe 2010). Most information sharing today involves tactical security information regarding technical vulnerabilities and real-time threat activity. There is also some sharing of 'best practices', though this seems to be simply pooling of ideas rather than any formal evaluation of practices to identify the 'best'. One difficultly is this: How will anyone use the information that is shared? It often lacks sufficient context and it is hard for recipients to 'connect the dots'
for their world The benefit of sharing information in the form of branching activity models is that it could add valuable context and causal information, both for planning purposes and for understanding historical breach episodes.
• Incentive Instruments and Institutions -When augmented by appropriate data collection and analysis capabilities, the proposed branching activity model could be very useful in various incentive instruments and institutions. This could include traditional cyber insurance (Department of Homeland Security 2012, Heal 2012, Zhao et al. 2009 ) or innovative institutions (Kupiec and O'Brien 1997 , Sommer and Loch 2009 , Thomas and Amon 2007 , Thomas 2009b ).
• Region and Sector Models of Disaster Impact -There is an extensive research literature on the estimation of the economic impact at a region or sector level of blackouts and natural disasters, and homeland security incidents. This research uses Input-Output models, Computable General Equilibrium , and multi-level Agent Based Modeling (ABM) (Anderson et al. 2007 , Clement 1989 , Rose 2004b , Okuyama 2007 , Rose 2004a . While the proposed branching activity model does not explicitly include sector flows and adjustments in market prices, the proposed branching activity model should be very compatible with these region and sector models. It does include information on causal pathways, including cascades in interdependent systems. An important area of future research will be to bridge these models particularly in ABMs where the micro-level mechanisms can be implemented directly in agent behavior or decision rules. 
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• Regulation, Compliance, and Audit -Finally, branching activity models could significantly enhance the value of regulation, compliance, and audit institutions. First, if Indicators of Impact were included in audit processes, there would be much more substantial basis for justifying audit judgments. Second, regulatory and compliance regimes could become less prescriptive without losing their ability to influence stakeholder decisions and behavior in the direction of social welfare.
Branching activity models provide a mechanism to link a firm's plans and preparations to outcomes, both in particular historical breach episodes and also for relevant future outcomes.
Future Research
The proposed method is in the early stages of development and testing, and thus would greatly benefit from additional research. In the body of the paper we have mentioned opportunities for research in specific areas, so this subsection will focus on a broad research agenda.
A major challenge facing the research community is how to advance the state of knowledge regarding economic, social, and behavioral incentives regarding information security (Cashell et compared to pace of research progress on technical information security and compared to the demands of the rapidly changing environment. We believe that the proposed branching activity model can serve as a useful building block in a broader research program that unifies theoretical and empirical social science research for information security, and also professional practice.
Obviously, a significant program of research is needed to test this assertion.
Another major opportunity for future research would be to incorporate the capabilities and strategies of threat agents in order to estimate the frequency of breach episode types, and also to estimate the likely harm that different threat agents might cause. Along these lines, another important extension would be to model the dynamics of adversarial innovation in a way that accounts for the unfolding co-evolutionary landscape of attack and defense capabilities (e.g. Thomas (2011b) ).
Finally, it would be very valuable to perform research that can shed light on the social processes of risk management to see if the proposed methods actually improve individual, organization, and social decision processes.
